or-buy question on one type of transaction cost: the hold-up problem.
This paper focuses attention on a different kind of transaction cost: haggling and friction due to ex post changes and adaptations when contracts are incomplete. The level of a transaction's complexity, which is associated with contractual incompleteness, will be the shifting parameter that determines both incentive schemes and integration decisions. This focus is motivated by a careful examination of procurement decisions in industry and has strong empirical content, since the exogenous shifter (complexity) seems easier to measure than specificity.1 build on my recent paper with Patrick Bajari (Bajari and Tadehs, 2001 ; henceforth BT), which addresses a particular aspect of marketbased procurement: what determines whether a product's procurement contract should be fixed price or cost plus? BT defines a project as more complex if it is more costly for the buyer to provide a comprehensive design to the seller. The model specifically endogenizes the design completeness of a contract as a response to complexity and identifies a simple trade-off: strong cost incentives for the seller are good for ex ante production costs, but bad for ex post renegotiation costs. BT compares fixed-price with cost-plus contracts and shows that simple projects (cheap to design) will be procured using fixed-price contracts and will be accompanied by high levels of design completeness (a low probability that adaptations are needed ex post). In contrast, more complex projects will be procured using cost-plus contracts with low levels of design completeness. These results are consistent with evidence from several industries.
The present paper is a first attempt to extend the insights from the BT model to address ' PRT offers itself as a general theory of the effects of contract incompleteness but does not lend itself easily to empirical examination (see Michael D. Whinston, 2001) .
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specifically the make-or-buy decision. This seems like a natural step since integration may be viewed as an extreme extension of cost-plus contracting.Î . Complexity, Flexibility, and Incentives This section develops a reduced-form model of contractual choice based on BT. Motivated by the construction industry, BT focuses on the effects of project complexity (the exogenous parameter) on two endogenous choices that the buyer makes. The first is how much design to perform ex ante, where more design reduces the need to renegotiate changes ex post (more design imphes a more complete contract). The second is what incentives the seller should receive, where higher incentives mean that the seller bears more of the costs of production.
Consider a buyer (B) who wishes to procure a project from a seller (S). Let T E [0, 1] represent the probability that contingencies that arise ex post are covered by the contract's design and no ex post adaptation will be needed. Thus, T can be interpreted as the completeness of the project's design. BT derives a model of endogenous design completeness as a response to project complexity and shows that completeness is endogenously inverse to project complexity. That is, the more complex a project is, the lower will design completeness be, resulting in a higher probabihty of ex post adaptation requirements. I combine BT's two variables (complexity and design completeness) into one variable and treat T as exogenous. To fix ideas, I interpret 1 -T as the complexity of the product. The buyer's remaining choice is the strength of cost-reducing incentives that the seller faces. Let z G [0, 1] be the share of costs that are borne by the seller. For example, z = I is a fixed-price contract while j = 0 is cost-plus.
In the event that the contract design performs well (which happens with probability r) then B obtains a payoff of v and incurs a cost ofc(z).
-See Michael Riordan (1990) , who defines integration as cost plus contracting together with the buyers ability to monitor upstream input costs. Birger Wernerfelt (1997) focuses on ex post adaptation and its effects on the scope of the firm but abstracts from explicit incentives.
Stronger incentives imply a lower cost of production, some of which is captured by the buyer ex ante through competition, so c'(z) < 0.Î n the event that the design fails and changes are needed (which happens with probability 1 -T), then B still incurs the costs c(z) but obtains a lowerpayoff of w(z) < v, withv'(z) < 0. This is a central component of the theory developed in BT. That paper shows that incentives cause more ex post surplus dissipation due to costly renegotiation under asymmetric information.
This yields the following objective function for B:
MB(2; r) = TW -I-(1 -T)viz) -c{z).
It is easy to verify that this objective function exhibits increasing differences in T and z (i.e., d^u^/(dz 9T) > 0), which yields monotone comparative statics in these variables (see Paul Milgrom and Christina Shannon, 1994 ): as T decreases (i.e., as the product is more complex), then so will the strength of incentives that the seller faces."* This is consistent with empirical findings and with an idea expressed by Williamson (1985 p. 140) when he wrote that "low powered incentives have well known adaptabihty advantages." Thus, the BT model helps organize thoughts about an important procurement question and, furthermore, sheds light on the conditions that are needed to explain the empirical regularities.Î
I. The Costs and Benefits of Integration
In the spirit of PRT, let integration (or make) mean that B owns the facilities and assets that are needed for S to produce the product. Let nonintegration (or buy) mean that S owns these assets. Without loss, confine the comparative analysis to investigate the costs and benefits of ' In BT this is generated by a moral-hazard model in which the seller will have stronger incentives to reduce costs when his payment is closer to a fixed-price contract.
* The comparative statics in BT are somewhat more involved as they show that both design and incentives are monotone in complexity.
BT shows that, for ex post friction to occur, it is necessary that costs of changes cannot be easily measured as distinct from other project costs. Measurement problems have been pointed out by Yoram Barzel (1982) as another source of transaction costs. integration to B, the downstream unit, who is the ex ante decision maker.
I assume that the benefits from integration are an increase in B's ex post value when changes are needed. Two sources can justify this assumption. First, in the spirit of TCE, this mitigates Williamson's ex post "fundamental transformation" since it will be less costly to replace S if negotiations break down. The temporal lock-in is reduced since B needs only to find capable people to do the job. Second, in the spirit of PRT, ownership gives B more residual rights to have modifications done his way. For example, if there are two methods through which a change can be made, one being more accommodating to B's downstream process, then B can direct S to choose the right method.
I assume that the costs of integration are that it is harder to provide cost-reducing incentives to S. This has two supporting mechanisms. First, the influential work of Bengt Milgrom (1991, 1994) on multitasking shows that incentives are detrimental when B owns the productive assets. If S is employed and uses B's assets, then when S faces incentives to reduce costs he will do this at the expense of abusing the assets, reducing value for B. Second, as noted by Williamson (1985 p. 139) , "responsibility for the accounting rules will be concentrated on the asset owner. Explicit agreements that limit accounting discretion notwithstanding, the supply stage runs the risk that costs will be reset to its disadvantage." This is strengthened if, in the spirit of PRT, B has the residual rights of control to change the allocation of assets ex post and make it difficult for S to reduce costs. Thus, S should indeed be less responsive to ex ante cost-reducing incentives.
Formally, let x G {0, 1} be the integration decision where make is x = 0, and buy is x = 1. Let the cost of production be denoted by ciz, x) with Cj(z, x) < 0 as before, and let the value to B in the event that changes are needed be v{z, x) with w^(z, x) < 0 as before (subscripts denote partial derivatives).
The benefit of integration (dampening the fundamental transformation and B having more residual rights of control) is captured by xi(z, 0) > v(z, 1). The costs of integration (multitasking and B having more control over changes) are captured by c(z, I) s c{z, 0), cjiz, 1) < cj,z, 0), and w^(z, 0) > w^(z, 1).
The first two conditions relate to multitasking: c(z, 1) ^ c(z, 0) implies that the benefits from the same level of incentives z are smaller under integration, and c^(z, 1) ^ c^(z, 0) implies that an increase in incentives is less effective under integration. The third condition, v^(z, 0) s vji,z, 1), is related to the ex post friction in bargaining and is consistent with the BT model. It says that the marginal effect of incentives on ex post bargaining costs is intensified when B is in a stronger bargaining position. The buyer's objective function is now
and the assumptions above imply that it exhibits increasing differences in T, Z, and x. This implies monotone comparative statics as follows:
Result: More complex products are more likely to be procured internally (make) and have the upstream unit face low incentives, while more simple products are more likely to be procured through the market (buy) and have the upstream supplier face high incentives.
This result follows immediately from the assumptions on c(z, x) and v(z, x) (which guarantee that 3MB/5Z and du^/dr are increasing in X, and that d^u-Q/(dz dr) > 0.) However, some of the important properties have been derived from more solid micro-foundations in BT, and the added assumptions follow the accumulated wisdom from PRT, TCE, and the works of Milgrom (1991, 1994) .
More importantly, I would argue, is that the comparative statics can be tested empirically in a meaningful way. Indeed, the important empirical studies of Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Masten (1984) show that the more complex a system (subcomponent) is, the more likely it is to be procured internally.
ni. Further Directions
The analysis above seems to ignore relationship specificity. In fact, by integration, I explicitly considered the case in which the assets and facilities are general (e.g., fioor space, simple tools, and standard equipment). Ownership of even general assets should help a downstream unit in case of negotiation breakdown, the source of ex post friction in my model. Nonetheless, the model does assume a role for specificity: it causes friction when ex post changes are needed. Indeed, if there was no temporal lock-in, then the downstream unit could always have many possible upstream firms to bid on the desired changes and prevent any loss in surplus.
TCE and PRT argue that more specific relationships lead to lock-in, which favors integration. Masten (1984) empirically demonstrates that both more specificity and higher levels of complexity lead to a higher frequency of integration. Furthermore, they seem to be complementary: the effect of each variable is strengthened with an increase in the other.
It is easy to introduce specificity into the model with a variable s, and then by defining the cost of production as c (z, x, s) , and B's payoff when things go wrong as v(z, x, s). B's objective would be It is then possible to state conditions on the cross-partial derivatives of (1) with respect to (z, X, s, T) that would generate the sort of correlations found in Masten (1984) . However, it would seem to take heroic efforts to justify such conditions with anecdotes and stories from TCE.
A more fruitful approach would be to conduct more stringent empirical tests in more industries to identify correlations that can help inform the theory in a "reverse engineering" way: empirical results will shed light on which correlations are common, suggesting which assumptions on the cross-partials in (1) are satisfied. Then, one can develop more fundamental microeconomic theories to shed light on other testable implications.
The model I have employed is of the mostreduced form, yet central parts are based on more elaborate micro-foundations. Major gaps remain, however, as a formal integration of these micro-foundations has not been performed, and the micro-foundations of how endogenous specificity might affect integration are missing altogether. More formal theory helps focus attention on what the first-order effects are and sheds light on issues that have been previously obscured. PRT has been the dominant theory for the make-or-buy question, but this paper argues that product complexity and the associated transaction costs this creates are important components of the story. There are more issues, such as transaction frequency, that I too ignore at this stage, and there is much left to be done (see Holmstrom and John Roberts, 1998) .
